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In a blockchain, the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort spent in it, represents the majority 
decision. To change the transaction data of a block, an attacker has to control more computing power than other honest nodes. 
This situation can happen if the attacker can hack into the systems of honest nodes. To analyze the probability of such event, 
we propose a probability model for analysis of attacks on blockchain. The model is based on the structure of a peer-to-peer 
network. We assume the state of each honest node follows a two-state (hacked or normal) Markov chains. A hacked node is 
assumed to be controlled by the attacker and its computing power belongs to the attacker. On the other hand, the computing 
power of a normal node belongs to the honest longest chain. We apply the model to study the probability of the majority 
decision is controlled by the attacker and the duration of such event. In addition, we analyze the magnitude of the loss for such 
event. 
 





Bitcoin has emerged as the most successful cryptocurrency. According to http://blockchain.info/charts/market-cap, the Bitcoin 
market capitalization is over 100 billion US Dollars as of October 2016. The coins of bitcoin network are created from the 
network protocol directly, without any central authority involved. Most of these economic value is generated from this 
innovation. As of October 24, 2016, the bitcoin blockchain wallet user is near 10 millions and daily USD transaction value is 
more than 120 millions on average (see Fig. 1). The computing power of the bitcoin network is greater than any supercomputer 
on earth. The current computing power is more than 2000 peta-hash per second (see Fig. 2).  Bitcoin is not just a virtual 
currency, it is a collection of concepts and technologies. Bitcoin was designed by software developers without apparent 
influence from financial industry or regulators. A key idea in bitcoin network is Proof-of-Work. A mining node shows its 
Proof-of-Work by solving a difficult cryptography puzzle and get rewarded. Therefore, the probability of receiving reward of 
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Fig. 1 Estimated daily USD transaction value of bitcoin blockchain 
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Currently, solo miner is very difficult to get rewarded. Mining pools are more likely to get rewards. Solo miner can join a 
mining pool to share the rewards and diversify his/her risk. Fig. 3 shows the major mining pools and their computing power. 
 




The basic attacker setup in [6] is as follows: “The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a 
Binomial Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the 
failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1”.  In this paper, we extend the analysis 
by adding more detailed assumptions. We assume two types of nodes: honest and attacker’s. When an attack starts, it will last 
for N blocks. N can be deterministic or following a discrete random variable such as a Poison random variable. Assume 
attacker’s node control   of total hash power when the attack begins. During the attacking period, an attacker’s node will 
remain as an attacker’s node with probability   when a block is created; and an honest node will remain as a honest node with 
probability   when a block is created. Based on these model assumptions, the majority decision is a two-state stochastic 
process (Asmussen and Glynn (2007)).  More precisely, let X0, X1, X2,…., XN denote the random outcomes of the created blocks. 
We assume X1 = 1 if it is created by an attacker’s node and X1 = 0 if it is created by an honest node. It is clear that  
 (   = 	1) = 	  
 (   = 1) =    + (1 −  )(1 − ) ≡    
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  (   = 1) =       + (1 −  )(1 −     ) ≡    
 
for n = 2, … N. From above recursion, we can also compute  
 
  (   = 1) = 1 −   − [(1 −  )(1 −  ) −  (1 −  )](  +   − 1)
   
 
for all n. 
Since only the double spending attack can incur loss, we assume the random loss Ln is incurred when block n is created 
by a hacked node or    = 1. The total loss of such an attack is 
 




From the states of the majority decision, all of the interested quantities can be derived via simulation. The interested 
quantities are EL and risk measures of L. To estimate such quantities via simulation, computational efficiency is usually an 
important and practical issue. Fast simulation algorithm for similar network problem can be found in [1] and [3] and fast 




 We proposed a probability model to address the importance attacker’s issue in standard blockchain protocol. Based on 
model’s parameters, we are able to address the probability of the system of being hacked in a certain time point. Furthermore, 
we are able to compute the expected loss and extreme loss during an attack event. 
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